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Abstract
It is often di¢ cult for external agents understanding to what ex-
tent the preferences of a government are directed towards welfare en-
hancing policies and reforms. I develop a principal-agent model in
which a domestic lobby attempts to inuence the governments policy
choices by means of monetary transfers while the weight the govern-
ment attaches to public welfare is private information. I observe that
asymmetric information generally leads to a larger policy distortion
in equilibrium. This simple setting serves as a benchmark for the
comparison with a commom agency framework. An International Fi-
nancial Institution giving policy conditional aid to the government is
included as an additional principle in the analysis. Its policy objective
is in conict with the lobbys one. Whether the equilibrium distor-
tion results lower or higher depends on the range of uncertainty over
the governments preferences and on the degree of benevolence of the
government.
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1 Introduction
Foreign aid is typically disbursed to the hands of recipient countriesgovern-
ments. However, it is often di¢ cult for an International Donor to understand
the real commitment of the governments to public welfare enhancing poli-
cies and reforms. The same occurs within the country to the interest groups
which do actively inuence the policy choices. The governments might nd
it convenient to hyde their preferences in order to extract more resources. If
the government is not seen as a unitary actor, but as a "two-soul" entity in
which both benevolent politicians and corrupt bureaucrats are present, the
relative weight of the two components might be di¢ cult to detect from out-
side. The uncertainty over the governments preferences is particularly high
when we deal with neo-elected governments. Initially I only consider the
interaction between the government and a domestic special interest group.
The governments utility linearly depends on aggregate welfare and on the
contribution received by the active lobby. I allow the government to have
private information over the relative weight attached to the public welfare
with respect to the payment obtained (I name this weight as the "consensus
parameter"). Taking into account how the New Regulatory Economics liter-
ature1 deals with the problem of policy inuence by special interest groups,
informational asymmetries and the trade-o¤ between allocative ine¢ ciency
and information rent extraction are central issues. Monetary transfers can
be used to reduce informational conicts. In this perspective, the political
power of a group is related to its ability to gain some informational rent. In
general the Incentive Theory states that asymmetric information may pro-
duce some distortion towards the ideal point of the informed party. In the
single agent model before and in the common agency model, once the inter-
national nancial institution is introduced, the principals contribution has
a double role. As in a standard pincipal-agent model it serves as a political
inuence instrument. In addition, it becomes the screening device to induce
the government to reveal its private information. Asymmetric information
allows the government to extract a positive information rent whatever its
preferences are, except at the top of the distribution. When the IFI enters
the game the context is one of conicting principals as the lobbys prefer-
ences towards policies are opposite. While under complete information the
competition between the two principals drives to a less distorted equilibrium
1See La¤ont and Tirole (1993) for a specication of this literature.
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than if the lobby was playing alone with the government, under asymmetric
information the equilibrium outcome is not always favorable to the inter-
national nancial institution. The size of the uncertainty (the range of the
distribution of the "consensus parameter") plays an important role.
In section 2 I develop the model with a single principal and under com-
plete information. In section 3 the model is extended to asymmetric infor-
mation. Section 4 presents the common agency case, both under complete
and asymmetric information.
2 The model
The political setting is characterized by a government which has all the pol-
icy decision power. Its reform choice, named  , assumes 0 value when it is
optimally implemented and a positive value when it produces a distortion.
The welfare of the political authorities negatively depends on the suboptimal
level of reform obtained and positevely on a contribution received by a reform
adverse lobby group. This positive payment does not produce any e¤ects on
the aggregate economy. It solely induces the government to opt for a distor-
tion. The typical principal-agent game that describes such a situation was
developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994)2 in the context of trade tari¤s
on import goods. Their results show that in equilibrium a certain distortion
is produced in return for a certain contribution. If the economy is marked
by only one group interested in trade protection the contribution results in
the minimum amount necessary to compensate the government from the de-
crease in general welfare caused by the distortion. When more lobbies are
competing each other to inuence the outcome of the policy the aggregate
contribution received by the government is larger. The aim of the present
work is to extend this setting to an asymmetric information context at the
presence of an International Donor giving aid to the country. The agents
utility is a linear combination of the aggregate economic welfare weighted for
a parameter representing the governments preferences for the public welfare
and the contribution schedule o¤ered by the Special Interest Group (SIG).
2Grossman and Helpman build their framework on the common agency model devel-
oped by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
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The equilibrium distortion negatively depends on this parameter. I assume
that the "consensus parameter" is governments private information. The
lobby cannot observe a before o¤ering the contribution. Governments wel-
fare is given by
G( ; a) = aW () + C() (1)
where the aggregate welfare W () negatively depends on the level of
distortion  at an increasing rate (W < 0 and W < 0) and a is the
parameter identifying the attention to public consensus (or also the quality
of institutions ). The SIG does not observe the governments "ideological
type". It is drawn from  = [0; a]3, the continuum of values between 0 and
a strictly positive upper bound of a (a), according to a distribution (a)
and an associated density function (a) > 0. Economic welfare is maximized
when there is no distortion ( = 0). In order to identify an explicit solution
to the problem, I dene it with the following function that satises the stated
assumptions.
W () = (Z    2) (2)
The governments objective function becomes
G( ; a) = a(Z    2) + C() (3)
The lobbys utility, net of the contribution, is given by
L() = U()  C() (4)
3The consensus parameter a = ( b1 b ), can be considered as the relative weight for the
public compared to the weight attached at the contribution in the governemnts utility.
We name b the weight associated to the public consensus and (1   b) the weight of the
contribution (where 0  b  1).
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where gross utility increases with the amount of distortion at a decreasing
rate (U > 0 and U < 0). I give an explicit function for U() too:
U() =  (  Q)2 (5)
Assumptions U > 0 and U < 0 hold when we resctrict the set of
existence of  to [0; Q]: Lobbys net utility results in
L() =  (  Q)2   C() (6)
Before allowing for asymmetric information, I characterize the equilibrium
outcome in the case of complete information. The political authorities and
the lobby play a two stage non cooperative game in which the SIG acts rst,
o¤ering (and committing to) a contribution schedule that associates a certain
amount of payment to each suboptimal level of reform implemented. In the
second period, after observing the funding plan, the government chooses the
degree of reform to implement in order to maximize its objective function. As
in Grossman and Helpman (1994) I limit the analysis to truthful equilibria
that guarantee a reliable committment on the lobbys side. Morever, as
the vested interest group does not face any competition in inuencing the
authorities, the given contribution exactly equals the di¤erence between the
governments utility when the reform is completely implemented (and the
lobby is not active) and the amount due to the suboptimal level reached
in equilibrium. The contribution is assumed to be feasible, that is it never
exceeds the total amount of resources of the lobby. Therefore, the distortion
driving to a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) comes from the
solution of the simoultaneous maximizations of the objective function of the
government and of the coalition formed by the joint utility of the government
and the lobby4. When these conditions are both satised the contribution is
truthful, because the marginal cost of nancing the government equals the
4See Grossman and Helpman (1994) for a detailed description of the equilibrium con-
ditions.
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marginal benet derived from an increase in the distortion. Solving the rst
order conditions gives
 2a + C = 0 (7)
 2a + C   2(  Q)  C = 0 (8)
from which we can dene the suboptimal level of reform occurring in
equilibrium as a function of the consensus parameter:
  =
Q
1 + a
(9)
The more benevolent is the government (the larger is a) towards the
general public the lower is the distortion. Parameter a is exogenouos. On
the contrary, the larger is the distortion desired by the lobby (Q), the greater
is the distortion in equilibrium5.
The resulting contribution in equilibrium becomes C( ) = a( )2 
06. Observe that the contribution is strictly positive except for the cases in
which the distortion or the consensus parameter are null. When there is no
distortion the lobby has no incentive in giving payments to the government.
The same holds when the government has no interest at all in the public
welfare. In this latter case, the equilibrium distortion is the highest possible
(Q), but the result is not driven by the political inuence of the lobby. When
a "bad" government is in place the SIG potentially acquires its objective
at zero cost7. Anyway, the equilibrium contribution rises as a increases8.
The lobby needs to contribute more to convince a relatively more altruistic
government to implement a distortion.
5Q is also exogenously given.
6The equilibrium contribution is derived from aW () +C() = aW (0) where W (0)
is the governments payo¤ obtained by in the absence of lobbying activity.
7 ...... considerations about the potential endogeneity of a
8Substituting the value of a derived from (3.9) in the equation of the equilibrium
contribution and calculating the rst derivative with respect to a yields @C= @a = [Q
2
(1 
a2)=(1 + a)4] > 0; for a < 1.
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3 Asymmetric information
Now I consider a situation in which the government knows its ideology pa-
rameter, while the vested interest group does not own such an information.
The problem can be examined as a Principal-Agent setting with asymmetric
information.
The lobby (principal) has to submit a payo¤ maximizing contract to the
political authorities who already possess a private information when con-
tracting takes place. The governments and the lobbys utilities functions are
respectively dened as
G( ; a) = aW () + C(a) = a
 
Z    2+ C(a) (10)
L() = U((a))  C(a) =  ((a) Q)2   C(a) (11)
The timing of the game is slightly di¤erent. In the rst stage the lobby
o¤ers a contract, based on a schedule which combines a monetary contribu-
tion to each distortion value, in order to induce the government to reveal its
consensus preferences. In the last period the government decides the degree
of reform to implement. As the distortion is produced the contribution takes
place. The government is required to announce its type before the contract
is submitted. Perfect commitment of the lobby is assumed since the focus of
the analysis is on truthful equilibria. The SIG has to maximize its welfare
by o¤ering a contract ((a); CG(a); CL(a)). For a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(BNE) to be reached, it is necessary to implement an incentive e¢ cient choice
function f(a) = ((a); C(a))9 that gives the government an expected welfare
at least equal to its reservation utility, for each possible value of a: Thanks
to the Revelation Principle for BNE, the equilibrium induced by a choice
9By assumption here the same contribution function positevely enters the governments
objective function and negatively enters the lobbys utility function. When linear utility
functions are considered, this condition is su¢ cient for Bayeasian incentive compatibility
to hold.
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function that maps each possible governments ideology type into the levels
of distortion and contribution can be replicated by means of a direct revela-
tion mechanism that induces truth-telling. As a consequence, the principal
can limit the search of such choice functions to the set of Bayesian incentive
compatible (BIC) ones.
The lobbys original problem is to maximize its expected payo¤ with re-
spect to the choice function, subject to incentive compatibility and individual
rationality constraints. Incentive compatibility guarantees that truthtelling
is an optimal strategy for the government and individual rationality rep-
resents the participation constraint for the agent. The government has to
obtain at least the same utility it would get if it did not receive the contribu-
tion (G(a) = aZ)10, otherwise it will not accept to take part in the contract.
G(a) is the governments reservation utility.
max
f(a)=(d(a);CG(a);CL(a))
E[U((a))  CL(a)] (12)
s.t. f(a) BIC (13)
a(Z    2) + C()  aZ; for each a 2 [0; a] (14)
I dene the governments utility when it reveals its true preference a as
G1(a) = a(Z   (a)2) + C((a)). Moreover, as CG(a) = CL(a) the problem
can be restated as follows:
max
d(a);G1(a)
Z a
0
[ ((a) Q)2  G1(a) + a(Z   (a)2)](a)da (15)
s.t. (a) non increasing11 (16)
G1(a) = G1(0) +
R a
0
W ((s))ds (17a)
G1(a) = aZ (18)
10The value of the distortion that maximizes the governments objective function when
there is no contribution is  = 0.
8
where (3.16) and (3.17) are respectively the necessary and su¢ cient con-
dition for incentive compatibility to hold. The participation constraint, equa-
tion (3.18), binds in correspondence of the highest value of a12.
The solution to the constrained maximization gives the optimal value of
the distortion under asymmetric information:
 AI =
Q
1 + [a  1 (a)
(a)
]
(19)
The equilibrium distortion is a function of a and of its distribution. For
the IC necessary condition to hold we need to have @[1 (a)
(a)
]=@a < 013: In
order to identify an explicit solution I assume a uniform distribution of a
for which the above condition is always satised. This implies
 AI =
Q
1 + 2a  a a 
a
2
>
a  1
2
(20)
 AI = 0 otherwise (21)
Observe that imposing  AI < Q (the necessary condition to have a distor-
tion increasing utility for the lobby) is su¢ cient to allow for a non negative
 AI . The distortion produced in equilibrium with asymmetric information
is higher than   except that for the upper bound value of the distribution.
When a = a; the distortion does not change with respect to the complete
information solution. The distortion is the same when the government is
purely benevolent and an upward distortion is present whenever the uncer-
tainty over governments preferences is very high. The government derives
a positive information rent whatever its preferences over a are. The lobby
succeeds in inducing truthtelling only for values of a which are larger than
the average size of the distribution. The intuition for that lies in the fact that
12G1(0) = 0Z = 0 is less restrictive. When the binding constraint holds this is always
veried.
13In Appendix 1 I derive the above solution.
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o¤ering a positive contribution to relatively bad governments may induce a
good government to mimic less altruistic preferences. From the governments
participation constraint I derive the contribution o¤ered in equilibrium:
CAI( AI) = (a  a)Z + a( AI)2 a >
a
2
(22)
CAI( AI) = 0 otherwise (23)
For each level of distortion the lobby has to contribute more to induce
the government to choose the same degree of distortion than if complete in-
formation were available. For each level of the consensus parameter of the
government, the higher is the uncertainty, the larger is the resulting con-
tribution. This explains the reason for which the equilibrium distortion is
increasing in a. Except for the case in which the government is purely benev-
olent (a = a), for any other value of its consensus parameter the government
obtains a positive information rent14 at the optimal contract. The marginal
contribution with respect to a is negative15. The SIG has to design its o¤er
in such a way as to induce the government to reveal its true preferences for
the public welfare. The only way is to reduce the payment attached to higher
values of a. This result is opposite to the one observed under complete in-
formation, where the marginal contribution was increasing in the consensus
parameter.The government, unless being purely benevolent, obtains benets
from hyding its preferences before taking part in the contract, because it
acquires a positive information rent. Anyway the interaction between the
government and the special interest group is less welfare erosing under com-
plete information.
14Information rent is dened as the the amount the agents utility that exceeds its com-
plete information reservation utility. Here it is given by (a a)Z: For a totally benevolent
government it is null, while for less altruistic governments it is always strictly positive.
15Substituing the equilibrium solution for AI in the equilibrium contribution equation
from (22), I can calculate @CAI=@a < 0. Note that the marginal contribution is negative
for any value of a suitable for the contract to be o¤ered.
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4 Conicting principals
I now introduce the presence of an International donor o¤ering foreign as-
sistance to the country in order to verify whether its e¤ects on the policy
outcome produce an improvement for the country. In this setting the gov-
ernment is a single agent who faces two principals, the lobby and the IFI
having conicting interests. The SIG wishes to induce the implementation
of a distortion as close as possible to its desired level (Q16). The IFIs net
utility instead is completely aligned to the economic welfare of the country.
In order to induce the government to pursue the implimentation of reforms it
o¤ers an assistance schedule depending on  . I address the case of conditional
aid17. The utility function of the lobby is the same as before:
L() = U()  C() =  (  Q)2   C() (24)
The IFIs objective function here is given by
I() =W ()  A() = Z    2   A() (25)
The government receives two payment schedules to be forced to divert its
policy decision in opposite directions.
G(a; ) = aW () + A() + C() = a(Z    2) + A() + C() (26)
The same assumptions about  and a are maintained:  2 [0; Q] and a is
uniformly distributed over a 2 [0; a].
16Note that, following previous assumptions, Q is also the largest possible distortion as
 2 [0; Q].
17Conditionality here implies that the amount of assistance disbursed depends on which
degree of policy (distortion) is implemented.
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4.1 Complete information
In order to identify a benchmark for comparison I rstly derive the equilib-
rium solution in the case of complete information.The problem reduces to a
common agency framework. Both the principalspayments enter linealry in
the governments objective function. The underlying assumptions are that
both the contribution of the lobby and amount of aid received do not have a
direct e¤ect on economic welfare, but only an indirect one through policies.
The reasons for that are mainly technical. As this case has to serve as a
benchmark I wanted to keep the same functional forms I use in the asymmet-
ric information context. I later discuss the problems related to accomplish
this analysis when dealing with the multiprincipal case. A payment function
entering nonlinearly in the welfare function would complicate the treatment
even more18. The original underlying model to address when solving common
agency models is Bernheim and Whinston (1984). Following them, I derive
the optimal distortion as the one maximizing at the same time the payo¤
of the government and the joint aggregate utility of the government and the
two principals. This yields to the following f.o.c.s:
 2a + A + C = 0 (27)
 2a   2   2(  Q) = 0 (28)
that lead to the following optimal distortion in the presence of an aid
nancing institution,
 A =
Q
2 + a
(29)
Observe that the distortion outcome is lower than in the absence of aid.
The fact that the international donor is purely benevolent amplies the mar-
ginal e¤ect of the distortion on the aggregate welfare. The total payment
18The alternative assumption that aid directly inuences public welfare, as in Monta-
nari(2007), is certainly reasonable, but here we limit the analysis to the simpler case in
order to focus on the di¤erent e¤ects under complete and asymmetric information.
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received by the government in equilibrium is higher. The total contribution
received by the government, when it accepts payments from both the prin-
cipals has to be C() + A()  a 2A 19 Each principals contribution has to
compensate the coalition formed by the government and the other principal
from what it gains from the equilibrium distortion. Otherwise, the govern-
ment could decide to accept the contribution only from one principal. The
lobbys contribution results in
C( A) = maxf0; (1 + a) 2A g (30)
and the IFIs assistance in
A( A) = f0; (1 + a)( 2A    2)  2Q( A    )g (31)
since the level of distortion that would be reached in equilibrium in case
aid were not accepted would be the one derived in the rst section,  . Note
that in equilibrium the aid disbursement is always positive20. The same oc-
curs for the lobbys contribution21. The lobby contributes more than when
acting alone only if the government is weakly benevolent. The marginal con-
tribution with respect to the consensus parameter infact is always negative.
It mirrors the way the consensus parameter a¤ects the utility of the lobby. A
19The equilibrium contribution is derived from the governments participation constraint
a(Z   2) +A() +C()  aZ. When only the lobby is present it has to guarantee to the
government a payo¤ at least equal to aZ. When only the IFI is present in equilibrium no
assistance is disbursed since its objective is completely aligned to the governments one.
Therefore the payo¤ obtained, absent the other principal, is still aZ.
20If aid is not accepted by the government the equilibrium distortion is the one of the
single principal case . Foreign assistance, in order to be accepted by the government,
has to leave the government and the lobby jointly as well o¤ as if aid were not given:
A(A) = a(Z 2)+C() (Q )2 C()  [a(Z 2A )+C(A) (Q A)2 C(A)]
Semplifying and substituting the equilibrium values for  and A we obtain A(

A) =
Q
2
=[(1 + a)(2 + a)2] which is always positive.
21Similarly, observing that when the lobby is not active the elicited distortion is 0, the
equilibrium contribution for the lobby is C(A) = aZ+A(0)+Z A(0) [a(Z 2A )+A(A)
+(Z   2A ) A(A):
Semplifying and substituting the equilibrium values for A leads to C(

A) = Q
2
(1 +
a)=(2 + a)2.
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larger benevolence (high a) is associated to a lower distortion22 which leads
to a decrease in the lobbys utility. The marginal benet gained from the
distortion decreases as the distortion rises. Hence, considering truthful con-
tributions, also the size of the marginal contribution tends to decrease for
higher values of  (and a more benevolent government). The total amount of
payments received by the government in any case is higher than when only
the lobby is present. The competition between the IFI and the SIG makes
the government better o¤.
4.2 Asymmetric information over the governments benev-
olence
Let us now assume that the importance given by the government to the public
welfare is its private information. Neither the lobby nor the International
Financial Institution know the value a takes for the government.
As discussed in the previous section, in agency settings with a single
principal, the principal problem can be restricted to the choice of a standard
direct mechanism, thanks to the revelation principle. In the case of multiple
principals, the agent has simouoltaneous information about the mechanisms
o¤ered by all the principals when he communicates with anyone of them. As
a consequence, any principal can design a mechanism in which the allocation
he selects can depend on the mechanisms that the other principals propose.
This leads to the risk of complicated regress strategies23. In order to over-
come the problem, Martimort and Stole (2002) observe that principals can
o¤er the agent a menu of contracts as an alternative. Moreover, Peters (2001)
demonstrates that in a single agent setting, for any set of indirect mecha-
nisms feasible for the mechanism designers and for any equilibrium relative
to that set, there is an equilibrium in menues that preserves the correspond-
ing equilibrium allocation. Martimor and Semenov (2006), building up on
the aforementioned results, recently treated the problem of asymmetric in-
formation in common agency policy models both as horizontal asymmetry,
regarding the distance between the agents and the principalsdesired poli-
cies, and vertical asymmetry, concerning the weight given to social welfare,
22More precisely, larger values of a lead to an equilibrium distortion which is farther
from the lobbys desired level Q.
23See McAfee (1993).
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which is consistent with the problem of my analysis. Following them, I set my
conicting principalss problem in order to analyse the equilibrium outcome.
Denote by G(a) the governments payo¤ when he accepts the payments
by both the lobby and the IFI and (a) the elicited distortion. The rent-
distortion prole {G(a); (a)} implemented by {C(); A()} satises
G(a) = [a(Z    2) + A() + C()] (32)
(a) = argmax
>0
a(Z    2) + A() + C() (33)
The maximization of the governments objective function24 (from equa-
tion (3.32) ) leads to the following f.o.c.
2a = A + C (34)
In the same way I dene fGL(a); L(a)g and fGI(a);  I(a)g the rent-
distortion proles associated respectively to the government accepting only
the lobbys contribution or the IFIs payment25:
GL(a) = [(Z    2) +C()] L(a) = argmax
>0
a(Z    2) +C() (35)
GI(a) = [(Z    2) +A()]  I(a) = argmax
>0
a(Z    2) +A() (36)
For a prole {G(a); (a)} to be implementable, following Lemma 1, pag.
9 in Martimor and Semenov (2006), it is su¢ cient to have
G(a) and (a) almost everywhere di¤erentiable, with, at any di¤erentia-
bility point, @G(a)=@a = (Z   )2 and @=@a < 0.
24The assumption of strict concavity of G(a) with respect to a will be veried ex-post.
Remember that W < 0 and W < 0.
25The assumptions of strict concavity and @(a)=@a < 0 must hold for these functions
too.
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The lobbys reaction function, for a given IFIs assistance A() is such
that the lobby maximizes its expected gross utility over the distribution of
a, subject to the standard incentive and participation constraints. We have
indeed
max
fG(a);(a)g
E[ (  Q)2   C()] (37)
s.t.  non increasing (38)
G(a) G(0) = R a
0
(Z   s)2ds (39)
G(a)  aZ; for each a (40)
Substituting C() from equation (32) into the maximand and calculating
the expected value yields to
max
fG(a);(a)g
Z a
0
[ (  Q)2  G(a) + (Z    2) + A()](a)da (41)
Similarly, the reaction function of the iFI is
max
fG(a);(a)g
E[Z    2   A()] (42)
s.t.  non increasing (43)
G(a) G(0) = R a
0
(Z   s)2ds (44)
G(a)  aZ; for each a (45)
that can be written as
max
fG(a);(a)g
Z a
0
[(Z   )2  G(a) + (Z    2) + C()](a)da (46)
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A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this common agency game under
asymmetric information is given by the combination of payments (C(); A ())
which implements a rent-distortion prole fG(a);  (a)g by solving the re-
action functions of both the principals.
The following f.o.c.s derive from the problem
 2(  Q) + A   2(2a  a) = 0 (47)
 2 + C   2(2a  a) = 0 (48)
From the governments payo¤maximization we know that A+C

 = 2a .
Summing up the rst order conditions this leads to the equilibrium distortion
under asymmetric information, in the presence of aid
 AAI =
Q
2 + 3a  2a a >
2a  1
3
>
2
3
(a  1) (49)
 AAI = 0 otherwise (50)
Firstly, note the simmetry with the single principal case. The distortion
 AAI is always larger than the one generated under complete information, 

A,
except at the top. When the government is purely benevolent (a = a) the
two solutions coincide. If the range of the distribution is very large (a > 1),
the rent prole of the government is associated to a positive distortion only
for the upper values of the consensus parameter.
The lobby has little incentive in o¤ering a contribution to a "bad" gov-
ernment. The rent prole is built in such a way as to remunerate only a
more reform prone government. This screening device allows to avoid "bad"
governments receiving higher contribution to implement the same level of
distortion they would have chosen in line with their preferences. From the
IFIs perspective instead, observe that, less altruistic governments tend to
induce a worse distortion environment. The IFIs objective is totally aligned
to the welfare of the country. Its role in a sense results in contrasting the ac-
tion of the lobby. When the government is not benevolent the utility gained
from giving assistance falls, because, everything else equal, the equilibrium
distortion will be larger.
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The marginal payments of the two principals are not equal. The marginal
contribution (in absolute value) of the lobby is always larger26. This is due
to the fact that the di¤erence between its desired distortion27 and the opti-
mal distortion the government would choose in absence of its contribution
is larger than the di¤erence between the IFIs and the governments optimal
distortions28.
Secondly, it is interesting to compare the equilibrium distortion under
asymmetric information of the single and the multiple principal settings.
When the range of uncertainty over the "consensus parameter" is low
enough (a < 1) the presence of the international nancial institution allows
for a lower distortion in equilibrium ( AAI < 

AI). The competition between
the conicting principals produces an improvement on the economic welfare.
However, if uncertainty increases (a > 1) this result is maintained only
when the government has a great interest in the public welfare (a > (a  
1)). Otherwise, foreign aid makes things worse. Observe that, while in
the single principal case, the value of the consensus parameter represents the
relative weight attached to the overall welfare compared to the one associated
to the lobbys contribution, in the common agency setting, since the IFI
shares the governments objective in terms of welfare, the implicit weight
associated to the total payments hydes a welfare-prone component. When
only the lobby is active an a = 1 means that the government gives the same
weight to the economic performance of the country and to the contribution
received. In the game involving the IFI, the same value of a underesteems the
importance attached to the economic welfare. In this sense the case of a < 1
is less restrictive in this framework. However, the assumption of a major
importance given to public welfare seems more reasonable, in particular since
I consider the inuence of only one interest group. In Table 3.1 I report the
equilibrium outcomes of all the analyzed cases under this hypothesis.
The reservation utility of the government is the same, absent each of
the two principals. When there is no aid, the lobby has to compensate
the government from the increase in the distortion by making him as well
o¤ as without the contribution. When the lobby is not active, the IFI in
equilibrium does not give any assistance, because the government already
pursues a zero optimal distortion. Each principal, anyway, in order not to be
26By expressing the equation of the equilibrium distortion in terms of a and substituting
it in the respective f.o.c.s , we can derive the marginal payments in terms of a.
27The level of distortion that maximizes its utility is (Q).
28The optimal distortion of the IFI and the government coincide.
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excluded from the game, has to contribute enough to leave the joint utility of
the government and the other principal unchanged with respect to the case of
its absence. The equilibrium payments in Table 3.1 are obtained in a similar
fashion under complete and asymmetric information, but in the latter case
the expected values have to be considered. This leads to the contribution
depending on the upper bound of the distribution of the consensus parameter,
a. The results resemble the ones obtained in Chapter 2. Here anyway, I
explicitely addressed conditionality, as the assistance schedule A() depends
on the level of distortion implemented. I individuated, though, an additional
channel through which aid can potentially induce more distorted equilibria,
even in the presence of conditionality. In this case, what drives to the "bad
equilibrium" is the wide uncertainty over the governments preferences.
Complete information Asymmetric information
1 Pr.   = Q
1+a
(++)  AI =
Q
1+2a a ; a >
a 1
2
(+++)
C( ) = a( )2 C( AI) = (a  a)Z + a( AI)2
2 Pr.s  A =
Q
2+a
(+)  AAI =
Q
2+3a 2a ; a >
2
3
(a   1)
(++++)
C( A) = (1 + a)(

A)
2 C( AAI) = E[(1 + a)(

AAI)
2]
A( A) = (1 + a)(

A
2    I2)  
2Q( A    I)
A( A) = E[(1+a)(

AAI
2 L2) 
2Q( AAI   L)]
Table 3:1 Equilibrium outcomes in the presence of high uncertainty over the governments preferences (a>1)
5 Conclusion
It is often the case that governments preferences towards collective welfare
are not common knowledge to the other agents of the economy. I analyzed
how a political setting characterized by the presence of a special interest
group is inuenced by this kind of asymmetric information. The lobby tries
to "buy" the government in order to a¤ect its policy decisions, but it does
not know to what extent the government weights public welfare with respect
to the contribution o¤ered. Asymmetric information in the internal political
game leads to a larger distortion in equilibrium compared to the complete
information setting when the government is highly altruistic. Only in the
extreme case of a completely benevolent government (when the consensus
parameter a coincides with the upper value of its distribution, a) the level
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of distortion under complete and asymmetric information is the same. In
this framework the lobby constructs a contract that associates to any level of
the consensus parameter (a) a given contribution. For not enough altruistuic
governments (a < (a 1)=2), however, the lobby does not succeed in pushing
the government to reveal its true preferences. Low levels of the consensus
parameter leads to higher degrees of distortion. If positive contributions
were "promised" to a "bad" government, this would have the incentive to
mimic more altruistic preferences in order to obtain a larger contribution to
implement the same degree of distortion it would have chosen anyway. Hence
,in order to induce the government to reveal its true preferences, low levels
of the consensus parameters have to be associated to a null contribution.
The simple Principal-Agent framework is then complicated by considering
the presence of an Internacional Financial Institution which gives aid to the
government with a benevolent porpose. The multiple principle setting can-
not be analyzed anymore by relying on the revelation principle instrument.
Both the lobby and the IFI make payments to the government with opposite
objectives over the degree of distortion to implement. They o¤er a menu of
contracts to the government that is designed taking into account both the
government objective function and the payo¤s obtainable by the alternative
decision of playing with only one principal. With complete information aid
makes the policy environment better. The distortion produced in equilib-
rium is lower than the one implemented when only the lobby is active. Aid
here is considered conditional on policies since the IFIs payment function
depends on the degree of distortion. Under asymmetric information instead
the equilibrium distortion is larger29. There is also the risk of ending up to a
more distorted equilibrium with respect to the the single-principal case un-
der asymmetric information. In particular this occurs when the uncertainty
over the consensus parameter is high (a > 1) and the government is not very
altruistic (a < (a  1)). Otherwise the standard results of an improvement
in the policy outcome due to the competition of conicting principals still
take place.
There is a variety of situations in which the preferences of the government
are perceived as highly uncertain. Unstable governments, for instance, are
typically less reliable. Their line of conduct is very volatile. This induces
29As for the single-principal case only in the extreme case of the consensus parameter
being equal to the upper value of its distribution the equilibrium distortions of the complete
and asymmetric information cases coincide.
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di¢ cultes in forecasting their consensus preferences. Recently elected gov-
ernments, especially in the context of a regime change, might accomplish
the objectives declared during their electoral campaign (or rise to the power)
or might not. Along the course of the analysis I have taken the consensus
parameter a as exogenous. Thinking about what factors it might depend
on, government reputation and previous committments would certainly lie
on top of the list.
In Montanari(2007) I analyzed the cases in which the presence of a benev-
olent International Financial Institution produces more distorted equilibria
with respect to the one observed when the government and a domestic lobby
interact. Here I extended thet setting to asymmetric information. Here I
extended the setting considered in the second chapter to asymmetric infor-
mation.
The analysis leads to identify an additional channel through which aid po-
tentially induces more distorted equilibria in the recipient countryeconomy.
Moreover, the kind of assistance I refer to is conditional aid which in Mon-
tanari (2007) allowed to induce less distorted equilibria. From an analytical
point of view, aid simply sums up to public welfare inside the governments
objective function. In practice, the e¤ectiveness of foreign assistance consid-
ered in this model is limited to the aid e¤ect on welfare through policies. I
isolated the direct impact of assistance on the economic welfare of the coun-
try from its indirect e¤ect and I considered only the latter one. The results
strongly depend on the volatility of the governments preferences. This spe-
cic factor has not yet been considered in the Aid E¤ectiveness Literature,
but it might play a role in explaining why the aid-policy interaction term of
growth regressions is not signicant in some specications. These empirical
studies use cross-country regressions and policy indexes. Country specic
e¤ects are generally taken into account only by means of the initial GDP
of the country and regional dummy variables. Further research on the topic
deserves proper attention.
6 Appendix
Here I derive the solution of the lobbys maximization problem in section
3. From the IC su¢ cient condition, I substitute G1(a) into the maximand
obtaining
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max
d(a);G1(a)
Z a
0
[ ((a) Q)2 G1(0) 
R a
0
W ((s))ds+a(Z (a)2)](a)da (51)
Integrating by parts we get
max
d(a);G1(a)
Z a
0
f[ ((a) Q)2 G1(0)+[a  1  (a)
(a)
](Z (a)2)g(a)da (52)
For the uniform distribution the hazard rate property necessary to guar-
antee that the concavity condition is always satised (@[1 (a)
(a)
]=@a < 0) ,
having (a) = a=a and (a) = 1=a. Observing that G1(0) = 0, and optimiz-
ing pointwise leads to the following f.o.c.30:
 2((a) Q)  2(2a  a)(a) = 0 (53)
that leads to the equilibrium distortion equation AI .
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